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ABSTRACT: It has been suggested in the literature about actions than one can honour the philosophical intuition ly-
ing behind Davidson’s argument for the Anscombe Thesis (the claim that by-sentences --sentences used to 
report actions of the general form: ‘A X-ed by V-ing’-- involve two descriptions of the same action) with-
out accepting the argument’s conclusion. The suggestion in question is to interpret by-sentences as refer-
ring to two synchronous but different actions of the same agent. I argue that this suggestion, together with 
two plausible semantic principles about the naming of events and a reasonable metaphysical principle about 
the constitution of events, leads to certain ontological commitments which are hardly acceptable. My con-
clusion is then that in order to deny the Anscombe Thesis what must be done is to show that Davidson’s 
intuition is wrong. 
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In our ordinary talk about actions, when we refer to an action A performed by an 
agent S, very often we ask ‘How did S manage to do A?’. As a response to such que-
ries it is natural to employ what is called a “by-sentence”. For example, an expression 
such as: ‘Booth killed Lincoln by shooting him in Ford’s Theatre’, seems an appropri-
ate response to the question: ‘How did booth killed Lincoln?’; likewise, uttering ‘Dirk 
repelled the floodwaters by building a wall’ seems an appropriate response to a ques-
tion such as: ‘How did Dirk repel the floodwaters?’.  Most philosophers of action ana-
lyse these by-sentences as implicitly containing two action-descriptions involving  the 
same agent. Thus, in the first example we refer to Booth’s killing of Lincoln and 
Booth’s shooting of Lincoln in Ford’s Theatre, and in the second we talk about Dirk’s 
repelling of the waters and Dirk’s construction of the wall. Following Jonathan Ben-
nett I will call the Anscombe Thesis the claim that the two descriptions implicitly used in 
by-sentences are in fact of the same action, and not merely of actions done by the 
same agent1. 
 Donald Davidson has given an influential argument for the Anscombe Thesis2. Let 
us take for example the sentence about Booth. In essence Davidson’s argument relies 
on the intuition that there is nothing done by Booth relevant to the action as de-
scribed by ‘Booth’s killing of Lincoln’ over and above what is done by him relevant to 
the action as described by ‘Booth’s shooting of Lincoln’, presumably his pulling the 
trigger of his weapon. Once he has pulled the trigger, the intuition goes, there is noth-
ing more that remains to be done by Booth which is relevant to the actions described. 
But then, if we insist that his action of killing Lincoln is not completed when his ac-
tion of shooting Lincoln is completed, on the grounds that Lincoln’s death occurs 
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later than Booth’s shot, it would turn out that some action of Booth has not finished 
during a time interval in which Booth himself does nothing relevant to it. Assuming 
that such a conclusion is absurd, Davidson concludes from it that what Booth does in 
doing what we describe as his shooting Lincoln is the same as what he does in doing 
what we describe as his killing Lincoln. There’s nothing that Booth does under one 
description and not under the other, so it seems to follow that the two descriptions re-
fer to the same single action of Booth. Of course the descriptions are different, but 
only because they pick out different consequences of Booth’s action (which is nothing 
other than a bodily movement, according to Davidson): namely, a Lincoln-directed 
shot in one case and the death of Lincoln in the other.  
 It has been suggested by Lawrence Lombard and Jonathan Bennett3, however, that 
sharing the intuition underlying Davidson’s argument does not lead one inescapably to 
the Anscombe Thesis. According to this suggestion, the intuition on which Davidson 
relies is that when the action described as ‘Booth’s shooting of Lincoln’ is completed, 
there is nothing more to be done by Booth which is relevant to his action as described 
by ‘Booth’s killing of Lincoln’. So the intuition compels us to accept only that the two 
action-descriptions refer to actions which are synchronous (they both take place at the 
same time) but not necessarily that they refer to the very same action. This is a sugges-
tive possibility since it blocks the serious problem that has to be faced by those who 
accept both Davidson’s semantics for action sentences and the Anscombe Thesis. The 
problem concerns Davidson’s treatment of adverb sentences. Consider the sentence 
‘Booth shooted Lincoln with a gun’. According to Davidson this sentence should be 
analysed as saying that there was a shooting done by Booth, directed to Lincoln and 
done with a gun4. However, since Booth shot Lincoln with a gun by pulling its trigger, 
commitment to the Anscombe Thesis forces us to say that Booth’s shooting was 
Booth’s pulling and so to conclude that the pulling was done with a gun, which is 
clearly false5. What I want to argue in this paper is that the suggestion made by 
Lombard and Bennett is wrong and therefore cannot be maintained as an alternative 
to the Anscombe Thesis. 
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 I’m not going to discuss Davidson’s intuition lying behind his argument here. 
However I will mention one worry concerning it that might be connected with the is-
sues at stake in this paper. It seems to me that there is a line of thought in Davidson’s 
writings according to which the intuition underlying the foregoing argument also sup-
ports the famous davidsonian claim that actions are nothing but bodily movements 
brought about in the right way by mental states of the agent. If this line of thought 
were correct, then there would seem to be no room for Lombard and Bennett’s sug-
gestion, since it seems that in the case of our example there is just one bodily move-
ment of Booth relevant to what is referred to by the two action-descriptions (and the 
same would apply, mutatis mutandis, to other instances of by-sentences). However, I 
will not pursue this matter here, and henceforth I will assume that Davidson’s intui-
tion does not commit us to his metaphysics of actions. 
 My argument will make use of one metaphysical principle which I find reasonable 
enough and it is widely held. The metaphysical principle says that an event (and, 
hence, an action too, because actions are kinds of events) involves the instantiation of 
a property at a certain time by some substances. As stated the principle is intended to 
be noncommittal between a fine-grained and a coarse-grained conception of events. 
According to the fine-grained conception, an event consists in the instantiation of a 
given property at a certain time by some substances. According to the coarse-grained 
conception, there could be events consisting in the instantiation of more than one 
property at a certain time by some substances. For example, ‘Dirk’s construction of 
the wall on Summer’ will be taken to refer  to an event (an action) involving the in-
stantiation of the property of building a wall by Dirk on Summer (and we remain non-
committal as to whether the event in question consists only in the instantiation of that 
property or involves the instantiation of other properties as well).  
I will also make two semantic assumptions which again I find reasonable enough 
and widely shared. One of these assumptions states that there are two different ways 
of referring to events: either by way of an intrinsic name or by way of an extrinsic or 
relational name. By an intrinsic name of an event it will be understood here a descrip-
tion that mentions explicitly at least part of one of the constituent properties of the 
event. This is opposed to a relational name, where the event is referred to by appeal-
ing to something to which it is related and not by mentioning part of one its constitu-
ent properties. If we assume a fine-grained conception of events, then the property 
mentioned by an intrinsic name of the event will be of course the only property con-
stituting the event. Not so if we assume instead the coarse-grained conception. More-
over, I use the expression ‘at least part of’ in the definition of an intrinsic name to al-
low for the possibility of cases such as the following one. Suppose, for instance, that it 
is true that Dirk constructed the wall in  record time, then ‘Dirk’s construction of the 
wall on Summer’ is an intrinsic name of an event that does not consist in the property 
of constructing the wall, but rather in the property of constructing it in a record time. 
Thus, according to this first semantic assumption, there might be cases of semantic 
indeterminacy with respect to the instantiated property, since intrinsic names do not 
need to mention completely a constituent property of an event, but only part of it. On 




be expected to be a more pervasive phenomenon, since typically event names will 
mention only one of the properties whose instantiation constitutes the event, but not 
all of them. As a non contentious example of a relational name of the same event 
suppose that Dirk’s construction of the wall was something that impressed Dorothy. 
So we could frame a relational name referring to Dirk’s construction of the wall in 
which this relational fact is mentioned. Thus consider the description ‘the action of 
Dirk which impressed Dorothy’. 
 The second semantic assumption concerns only relational names of events. Ac-
cording to the first semantic assumption a relational name of an event is one in which 
the event is referred to by mentioning a further event with which it is related. How-
ever, in the vast majority of cases the relational name will also implicitly or explicitly 
mention the sort of relation that the event referred to holds with the event alluded to 
in the relational name. For example, the name ‘the action of Dirk which impressed 
Dorothy’ not only relates Dirk’s referred action to an state of bewilderment by Doro-
thy, but it also implicitly says that Dirk’s action caused Dorothy’s bewilderment (so it 
says what sort of relation holds between the event referred to and the event appealed 
to by the name). Therefore, we should assume that in many cases relational names ex-
plicitly or implicitly mention not just an event related to their referent but also the sort 
of relation that holds between the two. In cases like this to understand a description as 
a relational name of an event will involve understanding that the referent of the name 
holds a particular sort of relation with the event mentioned by the name6. 
 Now I’m in a position to state the argument. Consider again the sentence ‘Booth 
killed Lincoln by shooting him in Ford’s Theatre’ and suppose that Lombard and 
Bennett’s suggestion is right. Therefore, this sentence is referring to two synchronous 
actions described by ‘Booth’s killing of Lincoln’ and ‘Booth’s shooting of Lincoln in 
Ford’s Theatre’. As Lincoln’s death takes place after Booth’s shooting of him it is 
natural to regard ‘Booth’s killing of Lincoln’ as a relational name, if the two actions 
must be synchronous. Being a relational name, it must then, according to our first se-
mantic assumption, involve mention of something related to its referent and possibly 
also of the sort of relation that holds between this something and the referent. Given 
that in the case at hand the relational name is ‘Booth’s killing of Lincoln’ it seems safe 
to conclude that the something related to the referent of the name is another event, 
namely, Lincoln’s death, and the sort of relation implicitly mentioned by the name is 
the causal relation. Therefore, on the assumption that ‘Booth’s killing of Lincoln’ is a 
relational name (an assumption that derives from the claim that ‘Booth’s killing of 
Lincoln’ and ‘Booth’s shooting of Lincoln’ refer to synchronous events plus the claim, 
reasonable enough, that Lincoln’s death takes place after Booth’s shooting), we reach 
the conclusion that this relational name refers to an event causally related to Lincoln’s 
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death (in fact, to an event that causes Lincoln’s death)7. On the other hand, it is pretty 
clear, given the story about Booth and Lincoln, that the event referred to by ‘Booth’s 
shooting of Lincoln’ also has Lincoln’s death as consequence. So far, then, we have 
two synchronous actions with a shared causal effect: Lincoln’s death.  
 Suppose now that ‘Booth’s shooting of Lincoln’ is an intrinsic name of the event it 
denotes. Thus, ‘Booth’s shooting of Lincoln’ refers to an action of Booth consisting 
of the instantiation (at least in part) of the property of shooting, according to our first 
semantic assumption.  Now, given Lombard and Bennett’s suggestion and the conclu-
sions reached in the last paragraph, it turns out that the event referred to by ‘Booth’s 
killing of Lincoln’ is synchronous to an event involving the same substance, Booth, 
and the same power of causing Lincoln’s death, and which is at least constituted by 
the instantiation of the property of shooting. Now given these facts and the story 
about Booth and Lincoln it seems necessary that Booth’s killing of Lincoln also is at 
least partially constituted by the instantiation of the property of shooting. All these co-
incidences between events make reasonable the thought that we have in fact just one 
event, simply by invoking reasons of simplicity and ontological parsimony. The facts 
of semantic indeterminacy alluded to earlier give us even more grounds to sustain this 
conclusion. One could object to this reasoning that its conclusion is more reasonable 
under a fine-grained conception of events than under a coarse-grained conception. 
But on second thought it does not seem to be so. Still in the case that we embrace a 
coarse-grained conception of events we would have two allegedly different events 
which are equal in time, substance and which share at least one property and at least 
one causal power. Here again, considerations of simplicity and ontological parsimony 
together with the acknowledged phenomenon of semantic indeterminacy in the nam-
ing of events, admittedly more widespread under a coarse-grained conception of 
events, recommend thinking of just one event, and not two. 
 The argument of the last paragraph was that if ‘Booth’s shooting of Lincoln’ is an 
intrinsic name of the event to which it refers, then Lombard and Bennett’s suggestion 
doesn’t look reasonable. So maybe the adherent to their suggestion should assume 
that ‘Booth’s shooting of Lincoln’ is also a relational name of the event denoted by it. 
However this alternative will not work either. For, suppose that the description 
‘Booth’s shooting of Lincoln’ is in fact a relational name of the action performed by 
Booth. Well, when does it take place, then? Note that we cannot identify the action 
with the bodily movement because in this case there are no (relevant) synchronous 
bodily movements of Booth. So, the two synchronous actions have to be dated be-
tween the bodily movement and the shot. But then again we would have two events 
sharing time, substance, and the powers of causing a shot and the power of causing 
Lincoln’s death. This is so because, according to our first semantic assumption, if 
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‘Booth’s shooting of Lincoln’ is relational given its meaning we should conclude that it 
refers to an event causing Booth’s shot. And given that Booth’s shot caused Lincoln’s 
death by transitivity of causation the event in question also causes Lincoln’s death. On 
the other hand if the event referred to by ‘Booth’s killing of Lincoln’ caused Lincoln’s 
death and occurred at the same time of an event (the one referred to by ‘Booth’s 
shooting Lincoln’) that caused another event, Booth’s shot, that caused Lincoln’s 
death, it better be that the event referred to by ‘Booth’s killing of Lincoln’ also caused 
Booth’s shot. Again so many coincidences between events would recommend identifi-
cation for reasons of simplicity and ontological parsimony. It rests open to us the pos-
sibility of dating the actions before the bodily movement, but this would probably lead 
to the problem of volitional acts, and that would be the worst of the options envis-
aged. 
 This completes my argument against Lombard and Bennett’s suggestion. What the 
argument shows is that the claim that in by-sentences we refer to two synchronous ac-
tions of the same agent, which is supposed to honour the intuition lying behind 
Davidson’s argument for the Anscombe Thesis, together with a metaphysical principle 
about the constitution of events and two semantic principles about the naming of 
events, commits us to an ontology of events which is unreasonable on account of rea-
sons of simplicity and ontological parsimony. Thus, we are forced to accept the exis-
tence of different events sharing substances, times, some of the constituting properties 
and some of the causal powers, remarkably enough, those causal powers which are 
implicitly mentioned in the names appearing in the by-locution. Barring an independ-
ent argument for such a populated ontology it seems fairly more reasonable to stick to 
the Anscombe Thesis. Barring also the possibility of another suggestion in the same 
spirit of the one proposed by Lombard and Bennett, the argument I have offered in 
this paper provides good reasons to think that acceptance of the intuition lying behind 
Davidson’s argument commits us to the Anscombe Thesis. Therefore, if one wants to 
show that the Anscombe Thesis is wrong it would seem that the only way to do so is 
to show that Davidson’s intuition is wrong8. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Annas, J. (1976). “Davidson and Anscombe on ‘the Same Action’”, Mind 85, 251-57. 
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1979). “Under a Description”, Nous 13, 219-33. 
Bennett, J. (1988). Events and Their Names. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
_____ (1994). “The “Namely” Analysis of the “By”-Locution”, Linguistics and Philosophy 17, 29-51. 
Cohen, M. (1970). “The Same Action”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70, 75-92. 
Davidson, D. (1967). “The Logical Form of Action Sentences”, in Rescher, N. (ed.). The Logic of Decision 
and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press. Reprinted in Davidson (1980), 105-48. 
_____ (1971). “Agency”, in Binkley, R., Bronaugh, R., Marras, A. (eds.). Agent, Action and Reason, University 
of Toronto Press. Reprinted in Davidson (1980), 43-61. 
_____ (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
_____ (1985). “Adverbs of Action”, in Vermazen, B., Hintikka, M.B. (eds.): Essays on Davidson: Actions and 
Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 230-41. 
                                                   
8 I’m deeply indebted to two anonymous referees of THEORIA for their comments on an earlier version of this arti-
cle. Their criticisms and suggestions have helped me to clarify and sharpen the argument contained in it. 
Synchronous Events in By-Sentences 
 
357 
Lombard, L. (1978). “Actions, Results, and the Time of a Killing”, Philosophia 8, 341-53. 




Final Version: 2003.06.16 
 
David PINEDA is associate professor in the department of philology and philosophy of the University of 
Girona. Although his research interests include the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science 
and metaphysics, most of his published works concern issues in the philosophy of mind, particularly on 
the mind-body problem and mental causation. On these subjects he has published some papers in the 
European Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Issues, Critica, Teorema and Theoria. 
DIRECCIÓN: Departament de Filologia i Filosofia, Universitat de Girona, Facultat de Lletres, Campus Ba-
rri Vell, Pl. Ferrater Mora, 1, 17071 Girona. E-mail: david.pineda@udg.es
